Climate change Systemic risk Stress tests Corporate governance and incentives

Natural disasters and financial stress: can macroprudential regulation tame green swans?

Can rules built for credit booms soften the financial blow of storms?

Pauline Avril, Grégory Levieuge and Camelia Turcu test whether macroprudential regulation dampens disaster-driven financial stress in their paper “Natural disasters and financial stress: can macroprudential regulation tame green swans?”.

They track the spread between bank lending rates and money market rates across 88 countries from 1996 to 2016, and measure 859 storms and 1,262 floods over the same period.

They integrate a regulatory stringency dimension through the number of macroprudential instruments a country has activated to show that:

  • The premium starts rising about a year after a storm and keeps tightening for 3+ years where macroprudential frameworks are lax, but falls durably where at least two instruments are in place.
  • Two years after a Katrina-like hurricane, a small country with a lax framework faces a 44 basis point rise in the premium, while a stringent framework brings a decline of about 67 basis points.
  • Estimated over 2006 to 2016 only, the compounded rise for a small, loosely regulated country reaches 219 basis points, while stringent frameworks keep financing conditions in check.
  • Each additional macroprudential instrument offsets about 20 of the roughly 29 basis points by which a typical storm shock raises the premium between five and twelve quarters after the event.
  • Middle-income countries drive the easing, consistent with reconstruction financing more productive capital, while low-income countries face tighter credit whatever their rules.
  • Floods show no conclusive effect, which the authors attribute to predictability: flood-prone areas are well identified, so risk avoidance and insurance leave less work for macroprudential tools.

The paper tests the green swan warning that climate hazards can exceed the shocks financial systems are built for and shows high-income countries gain little from stringency, contrary to lower-income ones.

It points to sound balance sheets that let banks fund reconstruction, in line with ECB and ESRB work arguing that the existing macroprudential toolkit can already contain climate-related systemic risk.

Stringency however counts activated instruments without measuring their calibration, and the sample ends in 2016, before supervisors began targeting climate risk explicitly, so the regulatory signal is coarse.